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Many historically-influential philosophers had 
profoundly wrong moral views or behaved very 
badly. Aristotle thought women were “deformed 
men” and that some people were slaves “by nature.” 
Descartes had disturbing views about non-human 
animals. Hume and Kant were racists. Hegel 
disparaged Africans. Nietzsche despised sick people. 
Mill condoned colonialism. Fanon was homophobic. 
Frege was anti-Semitic; Heidegger was a Nazi. 
Schopenhauer was sexist. Rousseau abandoned his 
children. Wittgenstein beat his young students. 
Unfortunately, these examples are just a start.[1] 
These philosophers are famous for their intellectual 
accomplishments, yet they display serious moral or 
intellectual flaws in their beliefs or actions. At least, 
some of their views were false, ultimately unjustified 
and, perhaps, harmful. 
How should we respond to brilliant-but-flawed 
philosophers from the past?[2] Here we explore the 
issues, asking questions and offering few answers. 
Any insights gained here might be applicable to 
contemporary imperfect philosophers, scholars in 
other fields,[3] and people in general. 
1. Concerns 
The question raises general concerns: 
A. People versus Propositions: 
Philosophers are distinct from philosophies: people 
are not their propositions. But thoughts 
say something about the thinker.[4] Which then might 
be of greater concern, the person or their writings? 
B. Ad hominem concerns: 
Some responses to flawed philosophers seem to be 
attacks on the person, not on their ideas. Ad 
hominem attacks are often irresponsible, but are they 
ever appropriate?[5] Are they appropriate if a 
person’s character affects their writings? Might 
personal moral vice relevantly 
impact moral philosophizing?[6] Can it impact non-
moralphilosophizing? 
C. Major versus Minor ideas: 
Philosophers are typically known for what has come 
to be considered their “major” ideas.[7] Their flaws, 
however, are sometimes displayed in what’s 
considered their “minor” writings. But what 
determines what’s major or minor? Quantity? 
Quality? Influence? That philosopher’s judgment? 
Moral evaluation? Is this ‘subjective,’ depending on 
readers’ perspectives? 
D. Counterfactual correction: 
Philosophies are sometimes developed from, or 
based on, false (empirical) information. If the thinker 
had better information, would their philosophy have 
been better? 
E. Apology and Forgiveness: 
Living people can apologize, pledge to do better and 
seek to make amends with the hope of forgiveness. Is 
there any way flawed (dead) philosophers can 
somehow “make it up” to the present or be 
“forgiven,” especially if their views eventually 
improved?[8] 
There surely are other potentially-relevant general 
concerns to be identified and applied. 
2. Responses 
Let’s turn to some general responses. 
A. Acceptance: Take the Good, Ignore the Bad 
One response is that we are all flawed, in thought and 
deed, and so we should focus on interesting and good 
aspects of flawed historical philosophers’ 
thought.[9] This is especially appropriate if their 
writings have no apparent connection to their bad 
claims or behavior.[10] We also often don’t know 
much about philosophers’ personal circumstances 
and inner life: this might make what they said or did 
understandable, if not excusable. 
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Unless we make it clear to readers that there are bad 
elements and that we are ignoring them, however, we 
risk misleading or deceiving them into believing the 
philosopher was not flawed: e.g., students may 
admire a philosopher and think he must have been a 
paragon of virtue, when he surely was not.[11] 
The “take the good, ignore the bad” response has 
limits: our own flaws, if too serious, should not be 
overlooked (even if we wish they would), and neither 
should anyone else’s. What then is too serious? 
B. Complete Dismissal: Boycott & Excommunication 
Another response is that we just stop reading, 
researching and teaching offending philosophers’ 
writings: we boycott.[12] 
‘Zero tolerance’ policies are sometimes invoked for 
contemporaries, with great confidence.[13] It’s 
comparable to ‘we won’t watch (or sell) any of his 
movies again, given what he did.’ If that has merits, so 
might this.[14] 
We might wonder though, what the point would be. 
For dead philosophers, this “punishment” is 
symbolic, at best. Removing them from “the 
canon” might at least show concern for people 
disrespected by that philosopher: prejudice won’t be 
tolerated anymore.[15] 
“Ex-communication” might be too much though. 
Future philosophers and students won’t benefit from 
that philosopher’s insights, and his legacy may be 
ruined.[16] It also creates a hole in the history of 
thought, a less-complete and sanitized version of 
history. This makes it more likely that offenses would 
be forgotten[17] and disrupts our understanding of 
later thinkers who were influenced by that flawed 
philosopher.[18] 
C. Historical Apologism: Judge by Past Standards 
It may be unfair to hold a past thinker to present 
standards. Nobody can be expected to challenge all 
the (moral) assumptions that later generations come 
to regard as indefensible.[19] Perhaps then we should 
partially or completely forgive these thinkers. Maybe 
they weren’t blameworthy for their views: given the 
standards of their times, they simply didn’t know any 
better.[20] 
This response really only works when flawed 
philosophers really didn’t know better.[21]Even then, 
though, we might think that they should have known 
better.[22] Philosophers tend to encourage critical 
thinking and challenging assumptions: they should 
better live up to that in their own lives, right?[23] 
D. Redemption: Using the Good to Defeat the Bad 
This response, like (A) above, involves acceptance, 
but instead of overlooking the bad, we display it and 
try to use the good aspects of a philosopher’s thought 
to diagnose and correct it. Concealing the bad is 
misleading and potentially deceptive to people not 
familiar with that philosopher: they might think he 
was like a saint, when he was really often a 
scoundrel. Had the philosopher realized his good 
claims were in tension with his bad claims, 
he might have rejected the bad in favor of the 
good.[24] But he might not have: he could have favored 
the bad over the good.[25],[26] Or he could have just 
ignored the tension. We can only speculate about 
how some philosopher would have responded to 
criticisms he maybe never encountered. 
But here are not always positive elements within a 
philosophers’ writings to critique bad claims, so 
optimism isn’t appropriate for all flawed 
philosophers. 
Redemption also has opportunity costs. Lesser-
known philosophers (especially minorities) who 
have ideas comparable to (or perhaps better than) 
famous philosophers may be overlooked in our 
efforts to redeem them.[27] 
3. Conclusion 
There are surely other possible responses; some 
might overlap with those discussed. Responsibly 
applying any of these responses requires detailed 
knowledge of a philosopher’s life and philosophy, as 
well as the application of general ethical concerns. 
Notes 
[1] An Appendix documents these claims about these 
historical figures. 
[2] For a Kant-focused discussion of the issues of this 
essay, see Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra’s “How to 
Deal with Kant’s Racism — In and Out of the 
Classroom,” Teaching Philosophy, 41, 2. May 19, 2018, 
pp 117-135. His article inspired this more general 
discussion here. 
[3] Of related interest is comparable concerns in 
responding to any bad behavior and claims of 
scholars and researchers in other fields, past and 
present. Some of our discussion below is potentially 
applicable: e.g., if the wrongdoing is totally unrelated 
to the area of research, this is likely of a lesser 
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concern – and wouldn’t give rise to the question of 
whether we should use that research – than, say, 
social scientists developing factual information about 
some social problems, yet wrongfully act in ways that 
contributes to those social problems or privately 
disparage the people affected by those problems. 
When empirical or scientific issues have moral 
dimensions, their researchers and scholars can be 
seen as likely having moral motivations for their 
factual investigations. In that way, they approach 
having philosophical perspectives on the issues, and 
so their flaws raise similar concerns to philosophers’ 
flaws. 
[4] It may be tempting to create a sharp division 
between philosophers and their writings, adopting 
the maxim “the author is dead,” that is, that we 
should treat the author’s background and intentions 
as irrelevant when deciding the merits of their work. 
But if Nietzsche is correct in viewing philosophy as 
an author’s autobiographical memoirs, this division 
may be wrongheaded. See §6 in Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil, Walter Kaufman 
(trans.), Vintage Books, [1886] 1989. 
[5] Charges of “hypocrisy” are sometimes ad 
hominem attacks, since whether a person follows the 
principles he or she advocates, in itself, says nothing 
about whether these principles are true or 
reasonable: e.g., if a vocal critic of shoplifting is found 
to have shoplifted, that gives no reason to think that 
shoplifting is OK. When controversial principles or 
claims are advocated for, however, that might suggest 
that their advocates don’t really believe them, or that 
they don’t really think there are good reasons for 
their principles (and, perhaps, that there are no such 
reasons). Alternatively, this might merely suggest 
that good principles are often hard to follow, even for 
those who identify these principles and recognize 
their goodness. 
[6] For a discussion of contemporary ethicists’ 
unethical behavior, see Oliver Burkeman’s, “This 
column will change your life: why are ethicists so 
unethical?” The Guardian, November 16, 2013. 
[7] What we consider the philosophers’ main ideas 
may not be what those philosophers considered their 
major ideas, or what past generations considered 
their major ideas. 
[8] Heidegger became disillusioned with Nazism later 
in life and some philosophers argue that Kant 
eventually grew out of his racist views. Should this 
influence our attitudes towards their earlier views? 
See Pauline Kleingeld’s “Kant’s Second Thoughts on 
Race,” The Philosophical Quarterly, 57, 229, 2007, pp. 
573-592. 
[9] This is roughly the strategy Robert Louden takes 
when he writes “Kant’s writings do exhibit many 
private prejudices … but Kant’s theory is fortunately 
stronger than his prejudices, and it is the theory on 
which philosophers should focus.” See his Kant’s 
Impure Ethics: From Rational Beings to Human Beings, 
Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 177. 
[10] As a potential example, is there a connection 
between, say, Frege’s anti-Semitism and his logic? If 
not, then perhaps there is no good objection to 
studying or using his insights on logic. 
[11] If we ignore the bad in a philosopher’s collective 
writings, however, it is not clear what principled 
ground we would have for construing that edited set 
of writings as thatthinker’s philosophy. This is 
especially the case if the philosopher in question 
worked extensively on the bad and believed them to 
be of the utmost importance, even more important 
than what we consider their good ideas. E.g., Kant 
who offered over seventy courses in anthropology 
and geography (where many of his racist views are 
found), but only twenty-eight in moral philosophy. By 
continuing to construe the remaining work as that 
thinker’s philosophy, we not only potentially mislead 
new philosophers, but also just interpret history 
incorrectly: e.g., Charles Mills argues that if we cut 
out the bad, or “sanitize” Kant’s philosophy, then the 
remainder would quite simply not be Kant’s 
philosophy, as it is not what Kant actually thought. 
See his “Kant’s Untermenschen” which proposes that 
Kant categorized human beings not just as ‘persons’ 
but also as ‘subpersons.’ In Andrew Valls (ed.), Race 
and Racism in Modern Philosophy, Cornell University 
Press, 2005, pp. 169-93. 
[12] It’s worth noting that a complete boycott is 
something that no individuals or groups have the 
power to do. At best, the offensive-to-many 
philosopher would remain in memory as a 
philosopher-who-used-to-be part-of-the-generally-
accepted canon, since the philosopher would surely 
retain some admirers. 
[13] See, for instance, online discussions concerning 
contemporary philosophers accused of sexual 
harassment. Jenny Saul Sheffield suggests “If you can 
avoid teaching/discussing [these philosophers], that 
may be the best strategy.” She then goes on to qualify 
this statement by mentioning, “If you just need a 
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representative of some family of views, you can avoid 
the whole issue by choosing someone else. If you 
really need to discuss [the accused’s] view, then you 
discuss [the accused’s view].” In light of this, 
discussing a less known thinker in lieu of the 
problematic favorite may serve as a way of 
diversifying the philosophical canon. Some 
discussions are here: “How to Discuss Searle, 
etc.” Feminist Philosophers blog, March 28, 2017, and 
“John Searle may be guilty of sexual 
harassment…” Leiter Reports blog, March 28, 2017. 
[14] In light of the #MeToo movement, the idea of 
boycotting the work of sexual predators has 
resurfaced. For discussions on this, see Nicole 
Hemmer’s “How to think about consuming art made 
by sexual predators,” Vox, January 9, 2018, and Chuck 
Klosterman’s “On Boycotting Woody Allen’s 
Films,” The New York Times Magazine, March 14, 
2014, among other discussions. 
[15] Habermas has a similar thought to this when 
engaging with the “Historian’s Debate” in Germany. 
Habermas however, seems to believe that in order to 
restore the dignity of historically oppressed 
populations, we should not brush aside the past, but 
instead keep it alive. He writes, 
“There is the obligation incumbent upon us in 
Germany … to keep alive, without distortion, and not 
only in an intellectual form, the memory of the 
sufferings of those who were murdered by German 
hands … [I]f we were to brush aside this Benjaminian 
legacy, our fellow Jewish citizens and the sons, 
daughters, and grandchildren of all those who were 
murdered would feel themselves unable to breathe in 
our country.” 
See his “On the Public Use of History,” The New 
Conservatism, 1989, p 233. 
[16] Whether dead people can be harmed or wronged 
is, of course, an interesting and controversial 
philosophical issue. 
[17] See note 15 above. The concern here is similar to 
the concern of “whitewashing” U.S. History if a 
teacher fails to discuss chattel slavery, segregation, 
genocide of Native Americans, etc. 
[18] Recall that we are discussing thinkers that have 
something (indeed, a lot) positive going for them: 
they are a well-known thinker for good reason. For 
any thinkers who don’t have this going for them — 
nearly everything they have to say is bad and wrong 
— it’s fine to cut them out and ignore them. Elizabeth 
Barnes discusses the intellectual and moral costs of 
discussing offensive views that have little to nothing 
in their favor in her “Arguments That Harm – and 
Why We Need Them,” Chronicle Review, February 18, 
2018. 
[19] Concerning contemporary people, few people who 
are “progressive” concerning one issue are 
comparably “progressive” about many, or all, other 
important issues: there is a general collective failure 
of “intersectionality.” This is not an ad 
hominem attack: it’s the observation that people tend 
to have (true) and reasonable beliefs about some 
(moral) issues, but false and unreasonable beliefs 
about others (and that we tend to resist revising 
those false and unreasonable beliefs). In this way, 
most of us are similar to the historical philosophers 
discussed in this paper. How should we respond to 
them, and us? For discussion, see an 80,000 
Hours podcast with Will MacAskill, “Our descendants 
will probably see us as moral monsters. What should 
we do about that?” January 19, 2018. 
[20] Miranda Fricker discusses this in regards to 
epistemic injustice when she mentions that sexists of 
the past “were not culpably at fault until they were in 
a position to know better,” in her Epistemic Injustice: 
Power and the Ethics of Knowing, Oxford University 
Press, 2009, p. 100. 
[21] Kant for instance, likely did know better as he 
“was an avid reader of travel reports of all kinds, 
written by explorers… He warned repeatedly on the 
unreliability of such sources, but rely on them he 
did.” See Thomas McCarthy’s Race, Empire, and the 
Idea of Human Development. Cambridge University 
Press, 2009, p. 49. 
[22] Although not focused on epistemic or intellectual 
blame, see Neal Tognazzini’s and Justin D. Coates’ 
“Blame”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, Spring 2016, Edward N. Zalta (ed.). For an 
intellectual blame-focused discussion, see Sanford C. 
Goldberg’s “Should have known.” Synthese, 194, 8, 
2017, pp. 2863-2894 and his To the Best of Our 
Knowledge: Social Expectations and Epistemic 
Normativity, Oxford University Press, 2018. 
[23] For that matter, it is not obvious we should hold 
anyone who studies ethics professionally (e.g., 
priests) to the same standards as the general 
population. Eric Schwitzgebel discusses this question 
in his blog post “Should Ethics Professors Be Held to 
Higher Ethical Standards in Their Personal 
Behavior?” 
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[24] One might imagine, for instance, Kant using his 
Categorical Imperative in order to dismiss his racist 
beliefs, or Mill using his principle of utility to defeat 
his endorsement of colonialism. 
[25] One can begin by looking at Charles Mills’ 
“Kant’s Untermenschen” in Andrew Valls (ed.), Race 
and Racism in Modern Philosophy, Cornell University 
Press, 2005, pp. 169-93. Mills’ The Racial 
Contract also deals with this issue. See also 
Emmanuel Chuckwudi Eze’s “The Color of Reason: 
The Idea of “Race” In Kant’s Anthropology” 
in Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader,” 
in Emmanuel Chuckwudi Eze (ed.), Blackwell, 1997, 
pp. 103-140. Also Robert Bernasconi’s “Kant as an 
Unfamiliar Source of Racism” in Philosophers on Race: 
Critical Essays, Julie K. Ward and Tommy L. Lott 
(eds.), Blackwell, 2002, pp. 145-66. 
[26] If the bad and good aspects of a philosopher’s 
thought are conceptually related, meaning that 
claims about one area have logical implications for 
claims about the other (and vice-versa), then they 
might be in tension. Analyzing and speculating on 
how philosophers reconciled this tension could help 
us avoid their mistakes in the future. David 
Livingstone Smith suggests that when populations 
dehumanize others there is cognitive dissonance 
between that population’s supposed beliefs (e.g. all 
people deserve respect) and their desired practice 
(e.g. to enslave or exterminate a minority). In which 
case, “the dissonance between theory and practice 
was resolved by denying the humanity of the 
oppressed” namely by attributing a less than human 
essence to the oppressed. See Smith’s Less Than 
Human: Why We Demean, Enslave, and Exterminate 
Others, St. Martin’s Press, 2011, p. 3. 
[27] See note 13 for more discussion on this. 
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In The Politics, Aristotle tells us plainly, “the relation 
of male to female is naturally that of the superior to 
the inferior, of the ruling to the ruled. This general 
principle must similarly hold good of all human 
beings generally” (1254b14). In Aristotle, The 
Politics, R.F. Stalley (ed.). Ernest Barker (trans.), 
Oxford University Press, 1998. Cynthia Freeland 
discusses Aristotle’s misogyny in detail, “Aristotle 
says that the courage of a man lies in commanding, a 
woman’s lies in obeying; that ‘matter yearns for form, 
as the female for the male and the ugly for the 
beautiful’; that women have fewer teeth than men; 
that a female is an incomplete male or ‘as it were, a 
deformity.’” In “Nourishing Speculation: A Feminist 
Reading of Aristotelian Science,” in Engendering 
Origins: Critical Feminist Readings in Plato and 
Aristotle, Bat-Ami Bar On (ed.), State University of 
New York Press, 1994. 
Also, according to Aristotle, natural slaves are 
unfortunate beings who are necessarily slaves due to 
their nature, as opposed to those who are 
contingently slaves (e.g. say, as a result of being 
captured in battle). In The Politics, Aristotle tells us 
“Someone is thus a slave by nature if he is capable of 
becoming the property of another (and for this 
reason does actually become another’s property) and 
if participates in reason to the extent of 
apprehending it in another, though destitute of it 
himself” (1254b22). 
In a letter to Henry More, Descartes described 
animals as automata with no thought. He writes, 
“speech is the only certain sign of thought hidden in a 
body. All men use it, however stupid and insane they 
may be, and though they may lack tongue and organs 
of voice; but no animals do. Consequently it can be 
taken as a real specific difference between men and 
dumb animals.” “Letter to Henry More,” February 5, 
1649” in A. Kenny (trans. and ed.), Descartes: 
Philosophical Letters, Clarendon Press, [1649]/1970. 
Kant made racist remarks about the “perfection” of 
the white race and the ineptitude of the non-white 
races right up until his death. Concerning white 
people, he claims, that it is “The white race 
possesses all motivating forces and 
talents in itself; therefore we must examine it 
somewhat more closely.” See Eze’s translation in his 
“The Color of Reason,” in Postcolonial African 
Philosophy: A Critical Reader, 1st Edition, Emmanuel 
Chukwudi Eze (ed.), Wiley-Blackwell, 1997, p. 115. 
The source is from one of Kant’s lectures, Kant’s 
philosophische Anthropologie: Nach handschriftlichen 
Vorlesungen. In Friedrich Christian Starke 
(ed.), Leipzig: Expedition des europaischen Aufsehers, 
1831, p 353. In his 1764 Observations, Kant tells us 
that: 
The Negroes of Africa have by nature no feeling that 
rises above the trifling [i.e., the unimportant or 
trivial] … Although many of them have even been set 
free, still not a single one was ever found who 
presented anything great in art or science or any 
other praise-worthy quality. . . So fundamental is the 
difference between [the black and white] races of 
man . . . A clear proof that what [a Negro] said was 
stupid [was that] this fellow was quite black from 
head to foot.  (Kant, Observations on the feeling of the 
Beautiful and the Sublime, in John T. Goldthwait 
(trans.), University of California Press, [1764]/1960, 
pp. 111-113. 
Kant’s views did not improve with age: in 1802, two 
years before his death, he claims that the “race of the 
[native] american cannot be educated,” “has no 
motivating force” and is “lazy.” Eze’s translation in 
the “The Color of Reason” p. 116. 
Hume made an infamous remark in a footnote to his 
1753-4 essay Of National Characters: 
“I am apt to suspect the negroes, and in general all 
the other species of men (for there are four or five 
different kinds) to be naturally inferior to the whites. 
There never was a civilized nation of any other 
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complexion than white, nor even any individual 
eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious 
manufactures amongst them, no arts, no sciences.” 
The complete footnote can be found in Jordan 
Winthrop’s White Over Black: American Attitudes 
Towards the Negro, 1550-1812, Omohundro Institute 
and University of North Carolina Press, 2012, p. 253. 
Further discussion of Hume’s racist remarks can be 
found in John Imerwahr “Hume’s Revised 
Racism,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 53, 3, 1992, 
pp. 481- 486, as well as Aaron Garrett’s “Hume’s 
Revised Racism Revisited,” Hume Studies, 26, 1, 2000, 
pp. 171- 177. 
In one of his many problematic quotes in Twilight of 
the Idols, § 36, Nietzsche writes “Morality for doctors. 
– Sick people are parasites on society. It is indecent to 
keep living in a certain state. There should be 
profound social contempt for the practice of 
vegetating in cowardly dependence on doctors and 
practitioners after the meaning of life, the right to life, 
is gone.” In The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the 
Idols: And Other Writings, Aaron Ridley and Judith 
Norman (eds.), Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 
209-210. Of course, exactly what Nietzsche means by 
sick people and sickness, whether he means physical, 
spiritual, or mental sickness, is unclear. 
In Black Skin, White Masks Fanon writes a damning 
criticism of Mayotte Capécia book I am a Martinician 
Woman and her desire for a white man, saying that 
“She is looked at with distaste. Things begin their 
usual course… it is because she is a woman of color 
that she is not accepted in this society. Her 
resentment feeds her own artificiality. We shall see 
why love is beyond the reach of Mayotte Capécias of 
all nations.” pp. 29-30. Fanon also writes “I have 
never been able, without revulsion, to hear a man say 
of another man: ‘He is so sensual!’” See his Black Skin, 
White Masks, Charles Lam Markmann (trans.), Pluto 
Press, 1991, p. 156. For a discussion on Fanon and 
feminism see chapter one, “Fanon, Conflicts, 
Feminisms,” in Tracy Denean Sharpley-Whiting’s 
“Frantz Fanon: Conflicts and Feminisms,” Rowman 
and Littlefield Publishers, 1998. 
On Heidegger’s Naziism, see Joshua Rothman, “Is 
Heidegger Contaminated by Nazism? The New 
Yorker. April 28, 2014, and Victor Farias’s Heidegger 
And Nazism, Temple University Press. 1991. Peter 
Trawny discusses Heidegger’s anti-semitism and 
notion of “world Judaism,” of which Heidegger says, 
“The question concerning the role of world Judaism is 
not a racial one, but rather the metaphysical question 
concerning the kind of humanity which, utterly 
unattached, can take over the uprooting of all beings 
from being as its world-historic ‘task.’” Peter Trawny, 
“Heidegger and the Myth of a Jewish World 
Conspiracy,” Andrew J Mitchell (trans.), University of 
Chicago Press, 2014, p. 19. 
In the Foundations of Arithmetic, Frege writes early 
on, “In arithmetic, simply as a result of the origin of 
India of many of its methods and concepts, reasoning 
has traditionally been less strict than in geometry, 
which had mainly been developed by the 
Greeks.” Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic. In The 
Frege Reader, Michael Beaney (ed.), Blackwell 
Publishing, 1997, p. 91. In late life, Frege became not 
only very conservative, but his diary also showed his 
sympathies towards fascism and anti-
semitism. Frege, Diary: Written by Professor Gottlob 
Frege in the Time from 10 March to 9 April 1924, G. 
Gabriel and W. Kienzler (eds.). In Inquiry : An 
Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 1996, 39, 3 & 
4, pp. 303-342. 
In the Philosophy of History, Hegel is very dismissive 
of Africa and its accomplishments. After briefly 
discussing the continent, Hegel writes “At this point 
we leave Africa, not to mention it again. For it is no 
historical part of the World; it has no movement or 
development to exhibit. Historical movements in it – 
that is, in its northern part – belong to the Asiatic or 
European World.” In Hegel, The Philosophy of History, 
John Sibree (ed.). University of Toronto Libraries. 
[1822-1830]/2011. p. 78 
Mill made pernicious comments regarding 
colonialism, saying that his anti-paternalist “harm 
principle” “is meant to apply only to human beings in 
the maturity of their faculties,” not to “backward 
states of society in which the race itself may be 
considered as in its nonage,” concluding that 
“Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in 
dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their 
improvement.” John Stuart Mill, On Liberty and Other 
Writings, Stefan Collini (ed.), Cambridge University 
Press, (1859]/1989, p. 13. For a critique of Mill and 
Locke’s colonialism, se Bhikhu Parekh’s “Liberalism 
and Colonialism: A Critique of Locke and Mill,” in The 
Decolonization of Imagination: Culture, Knowledge, 
and Power, Jan P. Nederveen Pieterse and Bhikhu 
Parekh (eds.), Zed Books, 1995, pp 81-98. 
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(trans.), Penguin Books, 2004, p. 81. 
For lengthy discussion and analysis on the lives and 
misdeeds of Rousseau, Wittgenstein, Nietzsche, 
and Sartre, among others, see Nigel Rodger’s and Mel 
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